Briefings: 1. Cain\u27s Curse 2. 1975 and All That? 3. Indonesia’s Political Shadowplay 4. Perestroika’s Perils 5. Acid Summer 6. Inside Left: Poor Relations by Andrews, Julia et al.
2 A U S T R A L I A N  LEFT REVI EW
Cain’s
Curse
S hortly after its historic third term re-election late last year, the Victorian Labor govern­
ment now finds itself embroiled in a 
major political crisis following 
revelations of mismanagement and 
incompetence in the publicly-owned 
financial institution, the Victorian 
Economic Development Corporat­
ion.
The scandal has rocked the 
government which, up till now, has 
prided itself on its capacity to 
combine a reformist economic and 
social program with efficient and 
honest financial management.
Now, in a move designed to 
minimise the political fall-out, the 
government has announced the 
abolition of the VEDC (its functions 
are to be incorporated into the Rural 
Finance Corporation), and Premier 
John Cain has announced a review of 
the role of government in direct 
stimulation of industry, mooting the 
handing over of responsibilities to 
the private sector.
The spectacular failure of a 
public sector agency to assess private 
sector risks has given the Victorian 
conservative parties something to 
cheer about, after most of the decade 
spent in the political wilderness. The
Bowing out: deputy premier Robert Fordham 
resigns.
state opposition mounted pressure 
for the resignation of Deputy 
Premier Robert Fordham, the 
minister responsible for the VEDC, 
and achieved their objective, 
Fordham resigning at the end of 
January. It has also threatened the 
use of its numbers in the upper house 
to frustrate the government, and will 
not rule out the possibility of 
blocking supply. These tactics may 
well destabilise the government if
decisions are not made to end the 
crisis.
At a more general level, the 
demise of an organisation like the 
VEDC holds important lessons for 
the left. In capitalist economies, the 
control of financial institutions is an 
important plank in a left economic 
strategy, with the ability to channel 
community savings into productive 
i n v e s tm e n t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in 
manufacturing industry.
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At first glance, the failure of a 
publicly-owned financial institution 
like the VEDC. echoed by the WA 
government’s disastrous intervention 
into Rothwells, would seem to be a 
vindication of the position that 
governments shouldn’t meddle in the 
affairs of the marketplace. Prior to 
looking at this in a bit more detail, it’s 
worth looking at just what happened 
to the VEDC.
In his report to the government, 
the chartered accountant Fergus 
Ryan stated that, by November 1988, 
the VEDC had become commercially 
insolvent, with potential losses 
amounting to $111 million. Even the 
staunchest defender of the VEDC 
would have been wavering by the end 
o f  R y a n ’s r e p o r t .  S e n io r  
management appears to have had 
little or no banking experience; 
finance was poured into pet projects 
of senior management without 
thorough economic analysis of their 
prospects; managers sat on the 
boards of companies which had 
borrowed heavily from the VEDC 
and became advocates for those 
companies; and there appeared to be 
little understanding of the 1987 
stockmarket crash.
On the positive side, the Report 
of Inquiry found no evidence of 
corruption (although it wasn’t 
specifically in the terms of reference), 
and Ryan did draw attention to the 
positive achievements of the VEDC. 
On the sensitive issue of the 
minister’s role, the report drew 
attention to the poor advice provided 
to Fordham by his department, but 
criticised him for signing letters 
committing the VEDC to sub­
undertaking (or picking up the tab if 
things went bad) for one of the 
VEDC’s largest and most risky 
ventures, in support of Wallace 
International Ltd.
The VEDC had come to play a 
key  ro le  in th e  V ic to r ia n  
government’s economic strategy. 
The thrust of the strategy is to 
id e n tify  key s t r e n g th s  and  
o p p o rtu n itie s  in the econom y 
and employ the resources of the 
public sector to expand activity in 
areas that are rapidly growing and 
have export potential. This includes
encouraging the expansion of a 
number of high technology activities 
in a d v a n c e d  m a n u fa c tu r in g ,  
information technology, biotech­
nology and communications. Due to 
the large amount of research 
required and their longstanding 
domination by multinational capital, 
support for the growth of these 
sectors is, by definition, risky. Yet, 
whatever one thinks of the merit of 
supporting high technology growth 
strategies, the fact of the matter is 
that active government support is a 
p r e r e q u i s i t e  w o r ld w id e  fo r  
tran sfo rm in g  m ature industria l 
economies into economies with a 
big propportion of high technology 
activities. Countries as diverse as 
Sweden and Japan have developed 
industry policies to modernise their 
industrial structures, with emphasis 
on high technology.
In Australia, the Victorian 
government has gone further than 
any other government, state or 
federal, in intervening in the 
development of new export-oriented 
activities. This is not a socialist 
strategy: rather, it is a strategy to 
modernise capitalism. To the purists, 
this in itself may be a reason for 
attacking the government and its 
financial follies. There is certainly 
m u c h  to  c r i t i c i s e  in  th e  
mismanagement of the VEDC. On 
the other hand, the Victorian 
econom ic stra tegy  has clearly 
improved the position of working 
people compared with the position in 
the non-interventionist Labor and 
n o n -L ab o r sta tes. Since 1982 
Victoria has consistently had the 
lowest unemployment rate of all the 
states and while NSW has attracted 
the lion’s share of foreign banks, and 
a range of property development, 
Victoria has been able to expand 
opportunities in the important 
knowledge-intensive and manu­
facturing sectors of the economy.
It is not yet clear to what extent 
the abolition of the VEDC will affect 
th e  g o v e r n m e n t’s a b i l i ty  to  
implement its economic strategy. It 
certainly won’t help. The Premier 
now appears to be saying that the 
government has been the catalyst for 
a number of new activities, and has 
taken a number of risks in the past.
and now it’s up to the private sector 
to take its share.
The problem is that it is 
difficult to have an activist industry 
policy without the support of the 
financial system. Unlike the West 
German and Japanes economies, for 
instance, where the financial system 
is d irected  tow ards long-term  
industrial objectives, Australia is 
c h a ra c te r is e d  by d e re g u la ted  
financing of new industries, there 
term investments and discriminate 
a g a in s t  lo n g - te rm  in d u s t r ia l  
investments.
The VEDC was poorly run and 
backed a number of ill-conceived 
projects. Yet Labor or, indeed, 
socialist governments, are always 
going to face serious dilemmas in 
setting up financial institutions to 
implement progressive economic 
programs. Firstly, there are few, if 
any, left-leaning bankers available to 
implement such strategies. Secondly, 
such in s titu tio n s  will still be 
d ep e n d en t on p riv a te  se c to r 
entrepreneurs to identify projects.
This is where the notion of 
planning becomes important. If the 
public sector is to be involved in the 
financing of new industries, there 
should also be a commitment to 
investigating how these industries are 
set up. Issues such as educational and 
training requirements, the role of 
w o r k e r s ,  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  
marketing all need to be addressed. 
Until the left is able to develop 
practical programs to confront issues 
relating to the setting up and running 
of productive enterprises,'it will have 
little relevance to major economic 
debates.
In the meantime, the problems 
id e n t i f ie d  by th e  V ic to r ia n  
government remain. There is no 
immediate prospect at a national 
level of a financial policy aimed at 
promoting industry development. 
Until such a policy emerges, there 
will be no alternative to modest 
a ttem p ts  by progressive state  
governments to supply finance in 
support of new industries — albeit 
hopefully with a more efficient and 
committed management than that 
revealed in the VEDC fiasco.
Julia Andrews
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1975 and All That?
I n the 1970s, Walter Lini, Barak Sope and Vanuatu’s former president Ati George Soku- 
manti were comrades in arms. 
Together they built up the South 
P acific’s most successful and 
democratic political party — the 
Vanua’aku T*ati (VP). With a truly 
grassroots organisation behind them 
t hey  l ed t h e i r  c o u n t r y  to  
independence from joint British- 
French rule.
After independence, Barak 
Sope became a roving ambassador 
su p p o rtin g  reg ional libera tion  
struggles. He also built up personal 
business interests which have made 
him one of Vanuatu’s wealthiest 
businessmen and, as Vanua’aku Pati 
general secretary, played a crucial 
role in maintaining the VP’s 
organisational support and its 
electoral strength.
As Prime Minister, Father Lini 
had to deal with the secessionist 
rebellion on Santo and to build a 
nation out of 80 disparate islands 
speaking over forty languages, all 
s u f fe r in g  fro m  th e  d iv id ed  
administration left by Vanuatu’s 
dual colonial heritage.
In early 1987, however, after six 
years in office, tensions became 
evident within the Vanua’aku Pati 
government. Sope was critical of 
Father Lini’s links with Vietnamese 
b u s in essm en , o f g o v e rn m en t- 
sanctioned monopolies on import of 
basic foodstuffs and of complacency 
among MPs which, he said, showed 
they had lost touch with the poverty 
suffered by many of their people. Fr 
Lini on the other hand was 
increasingly concerned about Sope’s 
tendency to mis his work for the 
Vanua’aku Pati with his own private 
business interests.
After Fr Lini suffered a serious 
stroke early in 1987 a leadership 
battle of unprecedented proportions 
began. The conduct of that struggle 
showed a relentless ambition on the 
part of Sope and a willingness by Fr 
Lini to jettison basic democratic
principles in an attempt to stay in 
power.
After Sope had made two 
unsuccessful leadership challenges at 
consecutive party congresses, Fr Lini 
began to move against his opponent’s 
power bases. Charging Sope with 
mismanagement and raising the 
possibility of corruption, Fr Lini 
closed the Vila U rban Land 
Corporation (VULCAN) — a body 
set up to collect rent from land in the 
capital on behalf of the traditional 
owners. While an independent report 
on VULCAN’s financial affairs 
confirmed Fr Lini’s suspicions, it was 
not published in time to stop 
immediate fallout.
In Vanuatu there is no more 
emotive issue than land and Sope, 
who was on the board of VULCAN, 
responded by organising a massive 
demonstration in Port Vila. An 
afternoon of drinking and the 
intervention of the paramilitary 
police led to a riot which left one man 
dead and over a million dollars worth 
of damage.
For his part in the riot Sope was 
sacked from his cabinet post and 
from his position as secretary- 
general of the VP. Along with four 
other Vanua’aku Pati MPs, he 
turned to the French-speaking and 
v i r u l e n t l y  a n t i - c o  m m u n is t 
opposition. Together they controlled 
23 out of the 46 parliamentary seats 
and could deny Fr Lini the ability to 
govern.
In June last year an unsuccessful 
attempt by Sope and his new 
coalition to move a no confidence 
motion in the Prime Minister led to a 
series of manoeuvres which ended in 
the expulsion of all 23 of Sope’s 
supporters from parliament. The 
opposition coalition responded with 
loud demands for a general election. 
They argued that having lost his 
majority on the floor of the house, Fr 
Lini was morally obliged to take his 
government to the people.
When Fr Lini called by- 
elections for the vacant seats, Sope 
and the French-speaking Union of 
M oderate Parties (UMP) were
Walter Lini and Barak Sope: at odds.
o u tra g e d . V a n u a tu ’s e le c to ra l 
system, in which a number of MPs 
are returned from each electorate, 
g u a r a n te e d  th a t  F r  L i n i ’s 
government would decimate the 
opposition’s numbers.
Sope and the UMP stepped up 
their campaign for a general election 
and announced an intention to 
boycott the poll. The aim of the 
boycott, he said, was to prove that Fr 
Lini had lost the confidence of the 
people. Although the president had 
no powers to sack the government, 
the opposition began to press him to 
intervene and dismiss Fr Lini.
With elections looming, both 
sides turned back to the villages, 
lobbying for support. Fr Lini, 
however, had what he regarded as his 
ultimate weapon — control of 
Vanuatu’s only radio station and 
n e w sp a p e r . He u n a s h a m e d ly  
instituted unprecedented media 
censorship, instructing journalists 
not to report anything said by the 
political parties promoting the 
boycott.
Two weeks before the by- 
elections, Fr Lini went even further 
and banned a presidential address to 
the nation in which the head of state 
had intended to call for compromise 
and for general elections. The Prime 
Minister justified his actions by
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Indonesia’s 
Political 
Shadowplay
saying that President Sokumanu, 
who is Sope’s customary uncle, had 
lost the impartiality expected of the 
head of state.
At the by-elections on 8 
December, only 37 percent of voters 
turned out,compared with a usual 
roll-up of around 80 percent. It was 
r that result, along with a number of 
Tailed attempts at reconciliation, 
which led to President Sokumanu’s 
abortive attempt to sack the Lini 
government. After the president 
swore in an interim government led 
, by Sope, he and the entire alternative 
administration were arrested.
With no legal backing for his 
ac tion , P resid en t S o k u m an u ’s 
in te rv e n tio n  a n o u n te d  to  an  
'attem pted coup. Having failed to 
approach the police for their support 
in advance, it was bound to fail.
With the advent of Christmas, 
Sope, President Sokumanu and five 
others were in prison awaiting trial 
v on charges of inciting mutiny among 
the police and Vanuatu Mobile 
Force and of sedition. The Supreme 
Court had declared the president’s 
d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  p a r l i a m e n t  
unconstitutional and the government 
had asked the Presidential Electoral 
College to impeach the head of state.
For Vanuatu it was a difficult 
year — and one that had spawned an 
underlying threat of serious violence.
T h e  l e a d e r s h i p  b a t t l e  
heightened regional and island 
chauvinism, as the Vanua’aku Pati 
divided between Line and Sope 
supporters. In Port Vila, people from 
Fr L in i’s n o rth ern  island of 
Pentecost, along with other Lini- 
supporting communities, bore the 
brunt of threats from breakaway 
group of Sope supporters. In the 
lead-up to the by-elections some Lini 
supporters were seriously beaten and 
government ministers and business 
leaders received death threats from 
an anonymous “Mr Black Dog”.
However, the threat of violence 
did not just come from the
opposition. After the riot in May, the 
government turned to Australia to 
equip it with riot gear. Gas masks, 
tear gas and tear gas grenade
launchers were flown in. With the 
assistance of Australian advisers, the 
paramilitary Vanuatu Mobile Force 
underwent an intensive training
program.
When the opposition called a 
peaceful demonstration shortly after 
the December by-elections, that
training was put to use. Armed with 
automatic weapons and Australian 
riot gear, the VM F sealed off Port 
Vila. Edgy and inexperienced, they 
succeeded in thwarting the protest 
but, in the process, accidentally shot 
a carload of tourists who failed to see 
an unlit roadblock in the dark.
When ALR went to press at tne 
beginning of February, President 
Sokumanu had been sacked. With 
Sope behind bars, F r Lini saw his 
way clear to announce that he 
intended to retire as soon as possible.
While the election of a new 
Prime Minister opens the possibility 
of a new period of reconciliation, 
it will also bring more uncertainty. Fr 
Lini has no obvious successor and, 
over the next few months, there will 
be some intense lobbying. On top of 
that, as a result of last year’s turmoil, 
the g o v e rn m en t has serio u s 
economic problems on its hands, and 
must steer the country through the 
trial of Sope and the former 
president without allowing the 
underlying tensions to turn into 
violence.
Diane White
O ne morning in June last year in Bali, the Japanese finance minister announced that his 
government was giving Indonesia 
$2.6 billion in soft loans to overcome 
its balance of payments difficulties. 
His Indonesian counterpart, Dr. 
Sumarlin, thanked him effusively, 
and then asked Japan to wipe out the 
entire Indonesian debt to Japan in 
the interests of “stability”.
Three months later, President 
Suharto announced the abolition of 
the cornerstone of almost a quarter 
of a century of intense political 
repression —Kopkamtib, the arm y’s 
Operational Command for the 
Restoration of Order and Stability. 
And, a month later still, two old men 
were led from their cells in Jakarta’s 
Cipinang prison where they had lived 
under sentence of death for more 
than twenty years, and were shot.
T h e s e  t h r e e  s e e m in g ly  
unconnected events issue from the 
ageing of Suharto’s New Order — 
ec o n o m ic a lly , p o li tic a lly  and  
ideologically. The regime is not in 
crisis, and there is no overt issue 
which fundamentally threatens it. 
Yet, in 1989, for the first time in more 
than two decades, there is a sense of 
the possibilities of change in the 
foreseeable future. The main players 
of Indonesian politics remain the 
same — President Suharto, the 
Army, and the government’s political 
party, Golkar — but their character 
and inter-relationship have begun to 
shift. After almost a quarter of a 
century of military dictatorship even 
small shifts and uncertainties are a 
welcome relief.
The heart of the changes in 
Indonesia today is economic, as the 
oil-fed rentier state begins to starve. 
The arm y’s overthrow of the radical 
nationalist President Sukarno in 
1965-66 not only liquidated the left,
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but set the Indonesian economy 
firmly back into the western- 
dominated international economy. 
Massive foreign aid from the 
In te rg o v e rn m e n ta l G ro u p  on 
Indonesia (IGGI) followed the 
restoration of “economic order” and 
an environment conducive to foreign 
investment.
M ore im p o rtan t still, the 
OPEC-forced jum p in oil prices in 
the early ’70s boosted Indonesian 
national and state revenues to 
unheard-of levels. In concert with 
large Chinese and foreign capitalist 
partners, an entire class of military 
officers grew rich renting the benefits 
of office. A booming rentier-culture 
changed the skylines of Jakarta and 
Surabaya, and fostered the growth of 
a middle class dependent on state 
spending. While a measure of the oil 
boom money reached the villages 
through government health and 
education programs, and petty 
traders benefited from the general 
expansion  in trad e , cap ita lis t 
transformation had its normal effects 
of increased rural inequality, forced 
urbanisation and the repression of 
labour.
Opposition flared occasionally 
in student challenges in 1974 and 
1978, but was for the most part easily 
contained. The memory of the 
killings of 1965-66 combined with a 
massive intelligence and security 
apparatus dominated by Kopkamtib 
pre-em pted  all but the m ost 
explosive challenges.
In the late 1970s, the Petition of 
50 group of former generals and 
senior political leaders announced 
their dissatisfaction with the New 
Order, and called for the restoration 
of constitutional rule, and the rule of 
law. With only moral authority on 
th e ir  s id e , th ey  n ev e rth e less  
embarrassed the government to such 
an extent that it imprisoned a 
number of its members (including a 
Secretary-General of ASEAN).
However, the most potent 
political force in Indonesia today is 
Islam, particularly in its militant, 
socially critical form. While the left 
is, for all practical purposes, non­
existent, Islam is becoming more 
important than ever. Over ninety 
percent of the  country is nominally
A crack in the facade: 1974 student protests.
Muslim, though most regard their 
faith the way most Australians 
regard Christianity — a matter of 
births, deaths, marriages and the 
equivalent of Christmas.
While the devout minority were 
am o n g  the a rm y ’s s tro n g e s t 
supporters in the overthrow of 
Sukarno (and many young Muslims 
in Java killed communists with army 
consent), many now feel betrayed 
and outraged at the level of 
corruption and manifest injustice of 
the New Order. What the army fears 
most is the combination of this 
theological critique with urban 
unemployment and rural poverty.
The threat exploded first in 
1984, when the largely devout 
Muslim population of the depressed 
port district of Jakarta, Tanjung 
P rio k , d e m o n s tra te d  ag a in s t 
apparently intentional desecration of 
a local mosque by the army. More 
than four hundred people were killed 
when soldiers opened fire, and many 
more were wounded. Since then the 
regime has worked hard with both 
carrots and sticks — trying to 
assuage the fears of moderate 
Muslim leaders, donating to Islamic 
charities on the one hand and, on the 
o th er, setting  the intelligence 
agencies on to real and imaginary 
I s la m ic  p lo t s ,  f o r c in g  a l l  
organisations to accept the state 
ideology as their own, and sentencing 
prominent Muslim figures to long 
prison terms in show trials.
The collapse in oil revenues has 
led to real restrictions in all 
government budgets, even the 
military (though this did not stop a 
$400m. arms deal with the US for F- 
16 fighters). This in turn has 
weakened the government-funded 
patronage machine. As the terms of 
trade have turned against the oil 
producers, national income has 
declined, and foreign debt risen 
alarmingly. This in turn has made the 
In d o n e s ia n  g o v ern m en t m ore 
vulnerable to both foreign and 
domestic pressures for economic 
reform — particularly from the IMF.
The critics’ key target is the 
dense network of import licences, 
official monopolies, tariff and other 
trade barriers erected in the past two 
decades by the Suharto government 
in  th e  n am e  o f  e c o n o m ic  
nationalism. In reality, the direct 
beneficiaries of this regulation have 
almost always been the military elite 
and, in recent years, particularly the 
fabulously rich Suharto family itself 
and their large Chinese capitalist 
partners.
In economic terms, Indonesia is 
in the Japanese, not the United 
States, sphere of influence, both in 
terms of investment and trade. The 
huge $2.6 billion loan this year was 
followed by larger than ever direct 
grants. Even the Japanese, however, 
were taken aback by the subsequent 
request for still further aid, even to
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the point of wiping out the debt. The 
foreign and domestic pressure for 
economic reform has resulted in 
some important changes towards a 
less a rb itra ry  fram ew ork for 
corporate activities, and some 
pulling down of the maze of 
regulation. Even some military 
officers have signalled their distress 
at the apparently unending greed of 
the Suharto children, expecting their 
father to call a halt to the rort.
The army leadership itself 
appears unsure of the direction it 
w ish e s  to  t a k e  p o l i t i c a l ly .  
Throughout most of 1988, senior 
army officers led by General 
Moerdani campaigned vigorously 
against the election of former State 
Secretary Sudharmono as Vice- 
president. Ostensibly, they were 
concerned that Sudharmono had 
alleged communist connections in 
Sukarno’s time, and they wished to 
save the p residen t from  this 
embarrassment. In reality, the army 
sees Sudharmono, a military lawyer 
and administrator, as someone who 
does not have the arm y’s interests at 
heart, who is “not a real army m an”, 
and as a dangerous civilianiser.
The government’s decision to 
abolish the de facto martial law 
command, Kopkamtib, was partly 
related to the need to negate 
international criticism of ongoing 
political repression — which had 
even surfaced in the staid councils of 
IGGI itself. Kopkamtib was replaced 
by B akorstanas — the C o­
o rd in a t in g  A g en cy  fo r  th e  
Maintenance of National Stability — 
headed by Moerdani’s successor as 
army commander, General Try 
Sutrisno. Since all of the repressive 
K o p k a m tib  l e g i s l a t i o n  a n d  
apparatus remain in place, in 
addition to the large and powerful 
m ilitary  S tra teg ic  In telligence 
Agency (Gais) and “civilian State 
Intelligence Co-ordinating Agency 
(Bakin), there is good reason for 
r e g a r d in g  th e  K o p k a m t ib /  
Bakorstanas change as cosmetic, at 
least for the present.
However, in a country where 
military power is almost absolute as 
far as most of the country’s citizens 
are concerned, even the smallestsigns 
of liberalisation are important.
U nfo rtunate ly , scepticism  was 
confirmed when, a month after the 
abolition of Kopkamtib, news 
surfaced of the execution of two 
army sergeants, arrested in 1965 and 
sentenced to death for their role in 
the internal army coup of 1 October 
1965 (which was followed by the 
Suharto counter-coup). The two old 
men had been imprisoned in 
Jakarta’s Cipinang prison for almost 
a quarter of a century, along with at
T he r e f o r m s  a i m e d  at  e l i m i n a t i n g  the S o v i e t  econom y’s over-centralised  
command system have run up 
against stumbling blocks. The 
attempts to remove the obstacles will 
be at the very heart of matters this 
year, when there is every reason to 
expect an intensification of the 
conflicts inherent in the struggle for 
change.
The main thrust of the reforms is 
to provide wide autonomy to the 
state-ow ned en terp rises which 
d o m in a te  in d u s try , t r a n s p o r t ,  
construction and trade, and which 
account for a significant part of farm 
output. Legislation which came into 
force in January 1988 has given 
plants more freedom to plan their 
output and use their income, but it 
has also preserved the authority of 
the ministries, enabling them to 
continue to pass orders down the line 
as if nothing much had changed.
There has been an outcry from 
many plant managers and workers, 
voiced in the press and at the 19th 
party conference in June, They are 
saying that the ministries should be 
given an advisory and consultative 
role at most. However, this demand 
has not as yet been met.
The big question is whether this 
will occur in 1989. Certainly, the 
elimination of the ministries in their 
old form is necessary for the success 
of the reforms, but it is unlikely that 
this will happen very soon.
The principal reason is that the 
leadership of the party and the
least another thirty communist, army 
and Muslim political prisoners under 
sentence of death. Their killing was a 
way of reminding Indonesians that, 
despite all the surface liberalisation, 
the military still intends to rule. 
National stability and development, 
military-style, demand sacrifices.
Lucy Rae
government are pursuing two goals 
at the same time: reforming the 
system and maintaining an economic 
growth rate consistent with the 
current five-year plan, which ends in
1990. The worry is that it will prove 
impossible to reach the overall 
quantitative targets of the plan unless 
a high degree of centralised economic 
control is maintained. Therefore the 
ministries continue to exist, and the 
only way they know how to operate is 
by commanding the enterprises 
which are strugg ling  to free 
themselves from controls.
A drastic change in policy is 
highly unlikely. The bureaucracy 
entrenched in the ministries is not 
ready to give way to the new 
economic order, and is sabotaging it 
in any way it can. E qually  
importantly, the economy is, in many 
respects, deteriorating — under the 
transitional, mixed order. Many 
plants, instigated and supported by 
ministries, are maximising their 
money incomes — not only by 
increasing physical output, but also 
by quietly raising prices and 
concentrating on high-priced fashion 
and luxury goods. Production of 
low-priced goods, including many 
essentials, is being minimised.
In this way, new shortages are 
created and the near-term goal of 
supply-demand equilibrium becomes 
less realistic.
The government will be using its 
central authority to promote the 
supply  of p ro d u c ts  of mass 
consumption, and may use some of 
its new foreign credits to improve the
Perestroika’s Perils
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Until the forces of competition 
are institutionalised, there is no way 
that the envisaged price reform can 
work: it will create runaway
inflation. Popular opposition led to 
the shelving of planned food price 
increases last year; for the reforms to 
retain popular support, it is essential 
that the price of food and other 
essentials remains under strict 
g o v e rn m e n t c o n tro l .  W here 
necessary, subsidies should be used 
as a temporary measure.
It is important to realise that 
price increases alone will not help to 
boost supply unless producers are 
willing and able to use their 
additional money incomes to invest 
in output.
They are not free to do that at 
present, so the extra income gained 
from  h ig h er p rices will be 
redistributed elsewhere and the 
relationship between supply and 
demand will not be improved.
The crucial area is agriculture 
because  the m ost im p o rta n t 
shortages are in food. The solution 
here lies in ending interference by 
local authorities in the affairs of 
collective and state farms and in 
p ro m o tin g  the lease system , 
including family farms and mini-co­
operatives. If the expansion of the 
lease system continues to be 
blocked, the idea of bringing the 
farmer back to the land will not 
succeed.
Stanislav' MenshikovAcid Summer
internal market. I do not believe that 
this will substantially improve 
things. The behaviour of the 
ministries is rooted in their dominant 
position in the economy. The 
m in is t r ie s ,  v i r tu a l ly  b ra n c h  
monopolies, have to be broken up 
into smaller units which should be 
com pelled to  com pete am ong 
themselves in the market.
Why should we have the 
Aeroflot monopoly rather than 
several competing organisations in 
the tourist trade? The need to 
promote competition and break up 
the ministries is widely recognised, 
but there are no signs that radical 
changes will come about soon.
One way to promote compet­
ition is to stimulate private and co­
operative activity, particularly in the 
p ro d u c tio n  and m arketing  of 
consumer goods. There has been 
some progress in this area. However, 
if such enterprises are to become an 
important factor in achieving market 
equilibrium, they have to be much 
more numerous. At present they face 
too many administrative and other 
barriers to secure the supplies and 
other resources they need to enter 
into business. Indeed, the existing 
m in i-co-operatives and private 
businesses are, in many cases, 
enjoying a virtual monopoly, and are 
thus adding to the inflationary 
pressures created by the inadequacies 
of the state-owned supply sector.
Some co-operatives have been 
infiltrated by members of the 
shadow economy seeking to legalise 
their own activities. The shadow 
economy has thrived in the past on 
the back of shortages created with 
the help of corrupt bureaucrats. It is 
far from ready to promote free 
competition in the areas where it 
prospers: there have been instances 
of force used against unwelcome 
newcomers to the field.
While this remains unchanged, 
co-operatives will add to inflation. 
They will be widely resented by the 
people and so will not be permitted to 
expand freely. This is a vicious circle 
which is likely to be broken in 1989 
only if the government makes special 
efforts to give more material and 
financial support to co-operatives.
Sydney’s Sun-Herald spotted it 
first: an ‘Acid House’ dance party in 
an inner-Sydney location, boldly 
titled after the dancefloor drug 
Ecstasy. What was this phenomenon, 
the paper asked, which had brought 
drug culture back to the music scene 
and back (sic) into the lifestyles of 
Australia’s young?
Like most contemporary media 
panics over what used to be called 
‘youth culture’, the scare was 
secondhand. The Acid House panic 
first hit the London tabloids with a 
splash in the last Northern summer 
— the season that with conscious or 
unconscious irony was labelled by 
the style arbiters ‘The Summer of 
Love’. Calls came from British Tory 
MPs to close down Acid House 
dance clubs; as a subversive influence 
on Britain’s young. Acid House had 
definitively replaced rap for the 
duration of the summer.
As a musical genre (if such it is), 
Acid House originated in the faddish 
British dance music scene. It’s an 
’eighties dance-floor pot-pourri with 
a psychedelic feel and it fits snugly 
into the toungue-in-cheek ’Seventies 
Revival’ which resurrected such 
disparate icons as platform shoes and 
flares, psychedelia and the music of 
James Brown.
Yet Acid House isn’t music so 
much as ‘lifestyle’, in the late ’eighties 
sense. The uniform is baggy T-shirts
with Smiley faces, oversized board 
shorts or cut-down jeans, and 
bandanas. The ‘mood’ is the 
euphoria of Ecstasy, the philosophy 
the slogan ‘D on’t worry, be happy’.
It first arrived in Australia 
through the upmarket ‘alternative’ 
music scene, with its hitherto black 
style ethos. An irony this; while black 
was still a uniform on some 
Australian dance floors in the 
summer, in London and M an­
chester’s bitter winters the ‘look’ was 
Australian ‘100% M ambo’ beach 
gear, beach balls — even inflatable 
pools in the smartest venues. Yet the 
craze here soon crossed over from the 
chic clubs to the more democratic 
beach scene (where, one presumes, it 
always belonged): so that streetsmart 
skateboarding beach kids in Sydney 
now wear bandanas and Smiley 
badges with their ‘100% M ambo’ 
shirts and flat-top haircuts.
‘1968 without the politics’, as 
one wit put it, it may well be. 
Certainly the rebelliousness of 1968 
is as far from this ‘summer of love’ as 
the political mood of the late ’sixties 
is from the conservative tenor of the 
late ’eighties. However, youth 
hedonism, now as then, is more than 
a marketing fad: clearly, the
‘consumerism’ of the late ’eighties 
doesn’t always take the forms the 
new free market gurus might wish.
D avid  Burchell
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Inside Left: 
Poor Relations
T he Industrial Relations Act (IRA) proclaimed at the end of last year is a good measure of 
the decline in Labor’s reformist role.
The conciliation and arbitration 
system had always been seen as the 
Australian way of regulating class 
c o n f lic t;  an d  by th e  la b o u r  
movement as at least having the 
advantage of institutionalising the 
role of unions and the protection of 
workers by the creation of awards 
linking like occupations across an 
industry.
The new Act invites the striking 
of special agreements between 
employers and their employees in a 
new Section 115 which provides for 
certification by the new Industrial 
R ela tions C om m ission (IR C ). 
Certification is possible providing 
the agreement is deemed to be in the 
public interest, and this is not 
disproved by being contrary to the 
national wage principles (normally 
sacred cows in wage settlements).
T his p rov ision  to  certify  
agreements is the A LP’s response to 
the pressure of the New Right and 
Opposition against the arbitration 
system . A greem ents can vary 
s ta n d a rd s  e ith e r  u p w ard s  or 
downwards. Indeed, on this point the 
Act is less restrictive even than the 
Opposition’s policy which at least 
provides for a “floor” below which 
wage rates should not fall.
W hile th e  IR A  c o n ta in s  
provisions which the ALP sees as 
advantageous in wooing business 
support, why were the unions so 
quiet about it? The answer lies in the 
promise it holds for rationalising the 
u n io n  m o v e m e n t in to  la rg e  
manageable blocs under federal 
jurisdiction.
Unionism today is less than ever 
before to do with membership 
involvement in campaigning, at least 
in the eyes of the ascendant
leadership of the ACTU. The issue is 
how to manage most effectively the 
expectations of members consistent 
with the national economic interest 
as expressed by Treasury. Thus the 
irrationality of consultation with the 
rank and file about high-level 
economc issues is apparent; far better 
to manoeuvre large units to placate 
interests, in deals from which the 
membership is largely or entirely 
excluded.
Section 118 of the IRA gives the 
te e th  to  the co m m issio n  to  
re s tru c tu re  the  tra d e  un ion  
movement in a way that the old Act 
could not. In a new sub-section, IRA 
enables a union to represent and, by 
other provisions, enrol employees 
who would not otherwise be eligible 
for membership and to do so aftr 
taking account of any agreements 
dealing with coverage. This is the 
prize for which the ACTU was 
prepared to see the passage of the 
IRA despite the fact that it 
contravenes a raft of ACTU and 
International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) policy.
The IRA contains provisions 
which mean that fines, injunctions, 
imprisonment, award cancellation 
and deregistration are all possible 
against unions and officials seeking 
to represent their members, need it be 
said, peacefully. In other words, all 
the baggage of Menzies, Barwick and 
Fraser in the Cold War against the 
unions. Not that sanctions are the 
purpose of the IRA, but they are seen 
as a price to be paid for getting an 
otherwise desirable reform through 
the Senate with Democrat support in 
particular.
T he p e rs is ten c e  o f th ese  
sanctions contradicts the ACTU 
submission to the Hancock Inquiry; 
the origin of the new IRA:
Legal sanctions that are directed towards 
limiting the power of unions to represent 
effectively the working men and women
of Australia w ill never be acepted by the 
union movement.
They also contradict the Hancock 
re c o m m en d a tio n s  and  H aw ke 
government promises, and a raft of 
ACTU policy and International 
L a b o u r  O rg a n is a t io n  (IL O ) 
Conventions such as Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise (87) and the 
Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining (98).
The role of political interests is 
widened in the form of the Minister’s 
right to intervene in any Full Bench 
matter, and in any m atter at all 
involving (federal) public sector 
employment. The likely effects of any 
decision on the level of inflation and 
unemployment must be taken into 
account. And, unless they are against 
the public interest, the commission 
must certify agreements which 
prevail over awards and operate 
outside the mainstream, although the 
commission may still be called upon 
to enforce these agreements. This 
avenue will be used for deals in areas 
of labour and skill shortages to be 
insulated from the bulk of the 
workforce.
It will also be a likely means of 
u n d ercu ttin g  aw ard co n d itio n s 
despite the inhibitions which prevent 
flow-ons from certified agreements. 
In  Q u e e n s la n d ,  “ v o lu n ta r y  
em p lo y m en t a g re e m e n ts”  are  
designed for this.
Simon Crean told the August 
Special Unions Conference that “no 
other union movement in the world 
has the status of the ACTU”, and 
that “the game” was all about 
“positioning for relevance”. When 
the Industrial Relations Act slips 
into the history of the Hawke 
government, it could prove to be an 
ACTU/ALP achievement better 
forgotten.
Rob Durbridge
